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Abstract. The IoT is a network of interconnected everyday objects called 
“things” that have been augmented with a small measure of computing 
capabilities. Lately, the IoT has been affected by a variety of different botnet 
activities. As botnets have been the cause of serious security risks and financial 
damage over the years, existing Network forensic techniques cannot identify 
and track current sophisticated methods of botnets. This is because commercial 
tools mainly depend on signature-based approaches that cannot discover new 
forms of botnet. In literature, several studies have conducted the use of Machine 
Learning (ML) techniques in order to train and validate a model for defining 
such attacks, but they still produce high false alarm rates with the challenge of 
investigating the tracks of botnets. This paper investigates the role of ML 
techniques for developing a Network forensic mechanism based on network 
flow identifiers that can track suspicious activities of botnets. The experimental 
results using the UNSW-NB15 dataset revealed that ML techniques with flow 
identifiers can effectively and efficiently detect botnets’ attacks and their tracks. 
Keywords: Botnets, Attack investigation, Machine learning, Internet of 
Thing (IoT) 
1 Introduction 
An increasingly popular new term, is the Internet of Things (IoT). The concept of 
IoT dates back to the early 1980s, where a vending machine selling Coca-Cola 
beverages located at the Carnegie Mellon University was connected to the Internet, so 
that its inventory could be accessed online to determine if drinks were available [33]. 
Today, the IoT is an umbrella term, covering a multitude of devices and technologies, 
that have both Internet capabilities, and serve some primary function, such as: home 
automation, including smart air conditioning system, smart fridge, smart oven and 
smart lamps, wearable devices (i.e., smart watch and fitness tracker), routers, 
healthcare, DVRs, smart cars, etc. In general, IoT can be viewed as a collection of 
devices with low processing power and some form of network communication 
capabilities that allow a user to remotely access and use their services or view 
information collected by them [33][34]. 
 
Recently, a number of malware have appeared that target IoT, as hackers and 
researchers alike have noticed that in the majority, IoT devices are mostly vulnerable 
to the simplest attacks, as displayed by Mirai, a botnet consisting of 100.000 infected 
“things” that in October 2016, attacked and took out a good portion of the Internet’s 
high-profile services such as Twitter and Netflix by doing a DDoS attack on Dyn 
(DNS provider) [36]. Since then, Mirai has slowly been divided into smaller botnets, 
and new botnets have risen, such as BrickerBot, which as its name implies “bricks” an 
IoT device (permanently disables it) and Hajime, a vigilante botnet which has been 
observed to infect devices targeted by Mirai, and “securing” the device, not allowing 
another malware to infect it. Clear methods have to be developed, in order to 
effectively mitigate and investigate at a forensic level IoT devices, as it is apparent 
that IoT is ever increasing in popularity, both by consumers (including companies) 
and hackers alike [35]. 
 
It is commonly known that the Internet is not a safe place, being full of security 
threats, with consequences ranging from mere inconvenience, to possible life-
threatening scenarios. Amongst these threats, a family of cyber threats called Botnets, 
considered to be the one of the most destructive capabilities [21]. A botnet is defined 
as a set of internet-based appliances, which involves computer systems, servers and 
Internet of Thing (IoT) devices infected and managed by a common type of attacks, 
such as Denial of Service (DoS), DDoS, phishing attacks [16] [21]. Bots differ from 
other malware, in that they include a channel of communication with their creators, 
allowing them to issue commands to their network of bots (i.e., Zombies) and thus 
making botnets versatile when it comes to their functionality [1][2]. 
 
Lately, there have been some prominent examples of botnets that harnessed the 
aggregated processing power of the IoT, and many infection routs have been revealed. 
One example is through the Internet, with portions of a botnet actively scanning the 
Internet for vulnerable devices, gaining access to them and then allowing a third 
device to infect the victim with the botnet malware [16]. Another is by using close 
proximity networks to gain direct communication with a device, infect it and allow 
the malware to propagate to the rest of the IoT devices in the immediate vicinity [17].  
 
Different security controls have been used for defining botnet events, including 
Network forensic techniques and tools and intrusion detection and prevention 
systems. The existing techniques and tools basically use the principle of expert system 
which is generating specific rules in a blacklist and matching the upcoming network 
traffic against those rules. In this study, we investigate and analyze the role of ML 
techniques to construct a Network forensic technique based on network flow 
identifiers (i.e., source and destination IP address/ports and protocols). According to 
[22] [23], Network forensic is a branch of the digital forensics in order to monitor and 
inspect network traffic for defining the sources of security policy abuses and 
violations.  
 
 Machine learning techniques, learn and validate given network data for classifying 
legitimate and anomalous observations, have been utilized for building Network 
forensic techniques, but there are still two challenges should be addressed: producing 
high false alarm rates and defining the paths of attacks, in particular botnet events [6] 
[22] [23] [24] [25]. Machine learning algorithms include clustering, classification, 
pattern recognition, correlation, statistical techniques [6] [24] [26]. In clustering 
techniques, network traffic is separated into groups, based on the similarity of the 
data, without the need to pre-define these groups, while classification mechanisms 
learn and test patterns of network data associated with their class label [6]. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is the use of four classification techniques, so-
called, Decision Tree C4.5 (DT), Association Rule Mining (ARM), Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN) and Naïve Bayes (NB) for defining and investigating the origins of 
botnets. The four techniques are used to recognize attack vectors, while the origins of 
attacks are linked with their flow identifiers as a Network forensic mechanism.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and 
related work then section 3 explains the Network forensic architecture and its 
components. In section 4, the experimental results are displayed and discussed and 
finally, the conclusion is given in section 5. 
2 Background and previous studies 
This section discusses the background and related studies for the IoT, Botnets and 
Network forensics. 
 
2.1 IoT 
Even though IoT is slowly been assimilated in one form or another in everyday 
life, there is no doubt that there exist a number of issues with respect to security and 
privacy. One such example, is displayed by Eyal Ronen et al. [37]. The researchers 
investigate a possible attack vector for Philips Hue smart lamps, and a way that these 
IoT devices, which primarily use Zigbee as a communication protocol for the lamps 
to communicate with each other and their controllers. The attack vector they proposed 
and tested, takes advantage of exploits found in such devices and proposed that, under 
certain conditions (number of devices and relative distance), a malware can spread 
through a city, “jumping” from device to device, or even permanently disable 
(“brick”) them.  
 
A more general point of view was adopted by M Mahmud Hossain, et al. [38], who 
provided an analysis on open security problems in the IoT. They showed, through the 
literature, that IoT devices have been proven to be insecure, with researchers 
successfully compromising them with relative ease. Then, based on the IoT 
ecosystem, which is made up of: IoT devices, Coordinator, Sensor Bridge Device, IoT 
Service, Controller, they proceeded to highlight that conventional security and 
forensics mechanisms are inapplicable in IoT, as such devices are constrained in a 
number of ways (processing power, battery life, Network mobility), as-well-as diverse 
(IoT devices range from simple sensors, to complex Personal Computers) and 
research on those areas should become a priority. On the other hand, Yin Minn Pa Pa, 
et al. [39], made observations on the nature and type of IoT devices being actively 
scanned through the Internet and went on to propose an IoT specific Honeypot named 
IoTPOT. Their solution included an IoTBOX a collection of virtual IoT machines 
(Linux OS), which helps make the Honeypot appear as a legitimate device. They 
observed a number of malware in action, most interestingly, they observed a repeating 
pattern, where a single host would perform the intrusion and information gathering 
process and the actual infection would be handled by a different host. Through the 
literature, it is evident that the field of IoT still being developed and as such various 
issues with this new and growing field are being discovered daily. 
 
2.2 Botnets in IoT 
In the literature, a variety of techniques that researchers utilize to understand 
Botnets and to study them has been observed. In their work, though not specifically 
related to IoT Botnets, Ashkan Rahimian, et al. [40] studied a Bot named Citadel. To 
specify, they employed several code analysis techniques to measure the similarities 
between Zeus and Citadel (Citadel being a “descendant” of the Zeus Bot) and in order 
to make the reverse engineering process faster they proposed a new approach named 
clone-based analysis, which attempts to identify parts of the malware's code that 
originated from a different source, thus reducing the amount of code an analyst needs 
to review. Botnet scanning and identification was the main focus of Amir 
Houmansadr, et al. [41], who introduced BotMosaic, a tool following an architecture 
similar to Client-Server. Among other things BotMosaic, performs non-distorting 
network flow watermarking, for detecting IRC Botnets, which is the non-altering 
(towards network traffic content) process of “Marking” traffic so that it can be 
identified at a later time period. Although many techniques have been developed, in 
order to scan, fingerprint, identify and generally investigate a Botnet, as time moves 
forward, malware authors adapt and make their Bots more difficult to identify, this 
combined with the unique nature of the IoT, produces issues which need to be 
addressed. 
 
Botnets are capable of launching a number of attacks, like Distributed Denial of 
Service attacks (DDoS), Keylogging, Phishing and Spamming, Identity theft and even 
other Bot proliferation [4]. Understandably, some research has been conducted in 
developing ways to detect and identify the presence of botnets in a network. One such 
way is the utilization of machine learning techniques on captured packets (Stored in 
files like pcap files) which are often grouped into network flows (Netflows), in an 
attempt to distinguish between legitimate user traffic and botnet traffic [5]. 
 
A botnet’s malware gets delivered to vulnerable targets through what is known as a 
propagation mechanism. Most commonly there exist two types of propagation, 
passive and active. Passive or self-propagation techniques rely on the bots themselves 
to actively scan the Internet for signs of vulnerable devices and then attempt to exploit 
the identified vulnerability, turning the vulnerable hosts into bots themselves [2][3]. 
Passive propagation techniques, require users to access social media posts, storage 
 media or websites that have been compromised and through user interaction, such as 
accessing URLs or other active parts of a website, download the malware (bot) to 
their machine, infecting it and making it part of the botnet [2][3]. 
 
Various studies [18][19][22][23][24][25][26] have employed Machine learning 
techniques, to distinguish between normal and botnet network traffic and designing 
Network forensic techniques and tools. In their work, Roux et al [18], created an 
intrusion detection system for IoT which takes into account wireless transmission data 
through probes. The information is collected, which is relevant to signal strength and 
direction, determining that a signal originating from an unexpected direction, such as 
outside of the location that is being monitored, is deemed illegitimate. The 
classification of whether the observed signal indicates an attack or not is produced by 
a neural network. In another approach, Lin et al [19], employed Artificial Fish Swarm 
Algorithm to produce the optimal feature set, which was then provided to a Support 
Vector Machine which detected botnet traffic. They reported a slight increase in 
accuracy when compared with Genetic Algorithms for feature selection, but produced 
great improvement time-wise. On the other hand, Greensmith et al [20], proposed the 
utilization of Artificial Immune Systems as a way of securing the IoT. They propose a 
combination of multiple AIS, in order to handle the heterogeneity of the IoT. 
 
2.3 Network forensics in IoT 
 
Network Forensics problem is governed by low availability of traces and evidence. 
For instance, Rana Khattak, et al. [27] tackled the problem of the ever-increasing size 
of network log files, by using parallel execution through Hadoop's MapReduce. 
S.Bansal et al. [28] proposed their own generic framework for detecting Botnets, 
focusing on Network forensics techniques, such as packet capturing and inspection, 
which has the structure of a balanced framework, although it appears to be quite 
theoretical in nature. 
 
Saied et al [29] employed an Artificial Neural Network for developing a distributed 
topology of DDoS inspectors residing in different networks, to detect DDoS attacks, 
based on timing and header inspection. Divakaran et al [30] developed their own 
Framework for detecting such attacks (DDoS), by employing a regression model 
based on defined patterns. They did so, by grouping packets into network flows, and 
flows into sessions, based on timing of packet arrival, and then through regression, 
they identify anomalous patterns in traffic, also providing information on detection 
rates for different botnets.  
 
On a different note all together, Wang et al [31] proposed an attack detection and 
forensics technique to tackle the threat introduced by malware. In their approach, an 
attack detection model locates the presence of an incident after which, it cooperates 
with a honeypot to gather relevant information, which are then used by a forensics 
module to carry out an automated forensics procedure. Their work is interesting, as 
they effectively make the forensic process more active than what it usually is. As the 
Internet is incorporated in an ever-growing number of technologies that are gradually 
adopted by society, it should come as no surprise that Network forensics adopts a 
more integral role in investigating malicious activity. 
 
3. Network forensic architecture and components   
The proposed Network forensics mechanism includes four components: 3.1) traffic 
collection, 3.2) network feature selection, 3.3) machine learning techniques, and 3.4) 
evaluation metrics, as depicted in Fig. 1 and explained below. 
 
Fig. 1: Proposed Network forensic architecture  
 
3.1 Traffic collection  
The immense volume of network traffic generated by todays networks, makes it 
necessary for a way to aggregate and summarize the captured packets, allowing for 
easier storage so that they can be used in construction of Network forensic 
mechanisms. Raw network packets are captured by using a tcpdump tool, which can 
access the network interface card to do so [15]. The next step is feature generation. By 
using tools like Bro and Argus, features are generated from the raw packets that were 
previously captured. The features in the UNSW-NB15 dataset were generated in this 
manner [15].  
 
The network sniffing process needs to be conducted at key points of the network, 
particularly, at ingress routers, to make sure that the network flows that are gathered 
are relevant, which is determined by the source/destination IP address and protocol. 
 This process helps, in investigating the origins of cyber-related incidents, and lowers 
the necessary processing time. 
 
 
Fig.2: collecting network features of UNSW-NB15 dataset [15] 
 
3.2 Network feature selection method 
 
Feature selection is the method of adopting important/relevant attributes in a given 
dataset. Method of feature selection is classified into filter, wrapper and hybrid of the 
first two. A filter feature selection mechanism denotes selecting suitable features 
without the use of class label, while a wrapper one depends on ML techniques [8][9].  
An example of filtering methods for feature selection, is Information Gain (IG) and 
Chi-square (x2). Wrapper methods study the performance of an algorithm that will be 
used in the end, as a criterion for selecting a suitable subset of the existing features. 
Intuitively, these methods split the features into subsets, and use these subsets to train 
the model that will be used after the pre-processing stage, using the error rate to score 
the subsets. Hybrid methods combine filter and wrapper methods to perform feature 
selection during the execution of machine learning algorithms. 
 
We use the information gain feature mechanism as it is one of the simplest 
methods that can adopt relevant features in large-scale data, as in network datasets. 
More precisely, Information Gain (IG) selects features, by calculates the apparent 
reduction in entropy, when the feature to be selected is used to split the dataset.  
 
3.3 Machine learning techniques 
For the classification stage, we use the Weka tool [42] for applying four well-known 
machine learning algorithms. These algorithms are briefly described as follows.   
 
• Association Rule Mining (ARM) [14]- is a classification algorithm, which is 
performed by generating rules of a form similar to {V1,V2,…,Vn} => {C1}, 
where V1-n are values of features and C1 is a class value. 
 
• Artificial Neural Network (ANN) [11][12]-  is a classification model which 
was based on the idea of the human neurons [11][12]. They usually are 
Tcpdump 
tool 
comprised of a number of neurons, which have multiple input flows and a single 
output, with some variants having multiple layers of units. The simplest form of 
an ANN is called a perceptron, taking the vector of attributes as input and 
classifying it.  
 
• Naïve Bayes (NB) [13]- classifies a record R1 (collection of features) into a 
specific class C2, if and only if the probability of that record to belong to that 
specific class, with respect to the record is greater than the probability of the 
record belonging to another class That is, P(C2/R1) > P(Cn/R1), with Cn being 
any class other than C2. 
 
• Decision Tree C4.5 (DT) [11]-  is a classification algorithm which produces a 
tree-like structure to determine the class chosen for a record. The attributes are 
used as the nodes of the tree and criteria are formulated leading from one node 
to the next, with the leaves being the Class value that is assigned to the record 
[11]. 
 
3.4 Evaluation metrics  
 
We utilize the confusion matrix [32] as a way of comparing the performance of the 
ML algorithms presented in the previews section. An example of a confusion matrix 
is given in Table 1. In simple terms, it is a table which depicts the possible outcomes 
of a classification, which in our case is either ‘1’, there was an attack detected or ‘0’ 
normal network traffic, against the actual values of the class feature already present in 
the evaluation (testing) dataset.  
There are four condition that can be shown in a confusion matrix, True Positive 
(TP), where the classifier has correctly identified the class feature and the value of 
that feature is positive (in our case there was an attack detected), True Negative (TN), 
similar to TP but the value of the class feature is negative (normal traffic), False 
Positive (FP), where the classifier identifies a record as an attack when, in actuality it 
is normal traffic and False Negative (FN), which incorrectly classifies an attack 
record as normal traffic.  
 
Table 1: Confusion matrix 
 Actual 
Negative 
Actual 
Positive 
Predicted Negative TN FP 
Predicted Positive FN TP 
 
By combining the TP, TN, FP, FN values we are able to create two metrics, 
namely Accuracy and False Alarm Rate, which we can use to evaluate the 
Classifiers. These two metrics are calculated as follows: 
• Accuracy represents the probability that a record is correctly identified, 
either as attack, or as normal traffic. The calculation of Accuracy (Overall 
Success Rate) is OSR= (TN+TP)/(TP+FP+TN+FN)  
 • False Alarm Rate (FAR) represents the probability that a record gets 
incorrectly classified. The calculation of the False Alarm Rate is FAR = 
FP+FN/(FP+FN+TP+TN) 
 
4. Experimental results and discussions 
4.1 Dataset used for evaluation and feature selection  
In order to compare the four aforementioned algorithms, we used the UNSW-
NB15 dataset was designed at the Cyber Range Lab of the Australian Center of Cyber 
Security at UNSW Canberra [15]. We selected UNBS-NB 15, as it is one of the 
newest datasets in wide use today, thus providing accurate representations of both 
conventional (not malicious) network traffic, as-well-as a number of network attacks 
performed by Botnets. The dataset was produced by making use of the IXIA 
PerfectStorm tool, which produced a mixture of legitimate user network traffic and 
attack traffic, with the latter being categorized into 9 groups, Fuzzers, Analysis, 
Backdoor, DoS, Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shellcode, Worms.  
 
Table 2: UNSW-NB15 Features selected with Information Gain 
Ranking Feature 
selected 
Feature description 
0.654 sbytes Source to destination 
transaction bytes 
0.491 dbytes Destination to source 
transaction bytes 
0.477 smean Mean packet size 
transmitted by source 
0.464 sload Source bits per second 
0.454 ct_state_ttl  
0.444 sttl Source to destination time 
to live value  
0.439 dttl Destination to source time 
to live value 
0.429 rate  
0.409 dur Record total duration 
0.406 dmean Mean packet size 
transmitted by destination 
 
A short description of these attacks is given here [43]. Fuzzers: where an attacker 
attempts to identify security weaknesses in a system, by providing large quantities of 
randomized data, expecting it to crash. Analysis, comprised of a variety of intrusion 
techniques targeting ports, email addresses and web scripts. Backdoor: a method of 
bypassing authentication mechanisms, allowing unauthorized remote access to a 
device. DoS: a disruption technique, which attempts to bring the target system in a 
state of non-responsiveness. Exploit: a combination of instructions, that take 
advantage of bugs in the code, leading the targeted system/network in a vulnerable 
state. Generic: an attack that attempts to cause a collision in a block-cipher using a 
hash function. Reconnaissance: an information gathering probe, usually launched 
before the actual attack. Shellcode: an attack during which carefully crafted 
commands are injected in a running application, through the net, allowing for further 
escalation by taking control of the remote machine. Worm: an attack based on a 
malware that replicates itself, thus spreading itself in a single or multiple host. The 
dataset is comprised of 49 features, including the class feature, and the portion of it 
that we will be making use, contains 257,673 (created by combining the training and 
testing datasets).  
 
To test the classifiers, we performed Information Gain Ranking Filter (IG) for 
selecting the highest ten ranked features as listed in Table 2.  
 
4.2 Performance evaluation of ML algorithms 
The confusion matrices of the four classification algorithms are listed in Tables 3-6 
on the training and testing sets of the UNSW-NB15 dataset. The Weka tool was used 
for applying the four techniques using the default parameters with a 10-fold cross 
validation in order to effectively measure their performance. 
Our experiments show that Decision Tree C4.5 Classifier was the best at 
distinguishing between Botnet and normal network traffic. This algorithm makes use 
of Information Gain, to pick the feature which best splits the data based on the 
classification feature, during construction of the tree and at every node. The test 
showed that DT had the highest accuracy out of all the algorithms that were tested at 
93.23%, and the lowest FAR at 6.77%. 
 
ARM was the second-best classifier, having an accuracy of close to 86% and FAR 
just over twice that of the DT. The Naïve Bayes classifier, which relies on probability 
to classify records in classes was third, with 20% less accuracy and close to 21% 
more false alarms than the DT. Finally, the Artificial Neural Network was the least 
accurate out of the four algorithms that we tested, with accuracy and false alarm rate 
for this classifier showing a 30% differentiation from the C4,5 algorithm. 
 
Table 3: ARM confusion matrix 
Normal Attack Prediction/Actual 
31785 10894 Normal 
12675 108654 Attack 
 
Table 4: DT confusion matrix 
Normal Attack Prediction/Actual 
84607 8393 Normal 
9058 155615 Attack 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5: NB confusion matrix 
Normal Attack Prediction/Actual 
84101 8899 Normal 
61380 103293 Attack 
 
Table 6: ANN confusion matrix 
Normal Attack Prediction/Actual 
2719 90281 Normal 
2562 162111 Attack 
 
Table 7: performance evaluation of four techniques 
Classifier Accuracy FAR 
ARM 86.45% 13.55% 
DT 93.23% 6.77% 
NB 72.73% 27.27% 
ANN 63.97% 36.03% 
 
A similar comparison of Machine Learning performance was conducted on the 
KDD99 dataset, arguably one of the most popular datasets still in use for security 
related work, like evaluating Network Intrusion Detection Systems [43]. 
 
Table 8: ANN confusion matrix 
Classifier Accuracy FAR 
ARM 92.75% - 
DT 92.3% 11.71% 
NB 95% 5% 
ANN 97.04% 1.48% 
 
 
Fig.3. accuracy vs. FAR of four classifiers 
 
 
By combining the identifiers of a network flow, with the corresponding condition 
Label, which depicts the result of the classification techniques mentioned previously 
that classify a record under “attack” or “normal”, the tracking of attack instances 
becomes possible. An example of the final form of the dataset is given in Table 8, 
which provides a number of flows and their classification label, taken from the 
UNSW-NB15 dataset. The network forensic technique that this paper illustrates, can 
assist network administrators, security experts or even law enforcement, to identify, 
track, report and even mitigate security incidents that threaten the security of their 
network.  
 
To produce the results depicted in Table 8, first the combination of flow 
information and Association Rule Mining needs to be performed, as shown in figure 
8. The produced rules indicate the type of attack and the means by which it was 
identified (features used in the rule), and later by combining that information with a 
row containing source/destination IP address/ Port numbers and protocol used, it 
becomes possible to attribute specific botnet activities to specific hosts. Such 
association between flow information and rule, can be of vital importance in 
monitoring botnet activities, through identifying infected hosts and showing their 
actions over time. 
 
 
Fig 4. Combining Flow data with Rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 9: flow identifiers associated with actual label for investigating attacks 
srcip sport dstip dsport proto Label 
149.171.126.14 179 175.45.176.3 33159 tcp 0 
149.171.126.18 1043 175.45.176.3 53 udp 0 
175.45.176.3 46577 149.171.126.18 25 tcp 1 
149.171.126.15 1043 175.45.176.3 53 udp 0 
175.45.176.2 16415 149.171.126.16 445 tcp 1 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper discusses the role of machine learning techniques for identifying and 
investigating botnets. There are four ML techniques of DT, ANN, NB and ANN 
machine are evaluated on the USNW-NB15 dataset. The accuracy and false alarm rate 
of the techniques are assessed, and the results revealed the superiority of the DT 
compared with the others. The best machine learning techniques and flow identifiers 
of source/destination IP addresses and protocols can effectively and efficiently detect 
botnets and their origins as Network forensic mechanism.  
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